Effective date: 2026-03-20
Last updated: 2026-11-16 (optional export to Google Sheets)
Provider: Didenco
Contact: jan@didenco.be
This policy consolidates Didenco's privacy and data-protection documentation for the handling of personal and special-category (medical) data. See also the Terms & Conditions and the Data Processing Agreement.
Roles under the GDPR. For account and user data (the healthcare professional's own data), Didenco acts as controller. For patient data submitted to or generated through the Service, Didenco acts as processor on behalf of the healthcare professional or, for a group practice, the practice, which is the controller — see the Data Processing Agreement.
1. Privacy Notice
What We Collect
Account data: name, email, role, login metadata, and the practice the user belongs to with their role in it (admin, member, or awaiting approval).
Patient and session data: patient names, medical notes, diagnosis-related content, transcript, conversation summary, medical reports, example medical reports, and files you upload.
Audio recordings themselves are not stored in the database.
Technical metadata may be processed in infrastructure security/audit logs (for example AWS logs), and is not stored in the application database.
Why We Process Data
To provide and secure the service.
To maintain clinical/session records.
To comply with legal and regulatory duties.
To support users and improve reliability.
Legal Bases
Account/user data (Didenco as controller): performance of the service contract — Art. 6(1)(b).
Patient data (Didenco as processor, on behalf of the healthcare professional as controller): processed on the documented instructions and legal basis of the healthcare professional — typically Art. 6(1)(b)/(c) combined with Art. 9(2)(h) (provision of health care and medical diagnosis), or Art. 9(2)(a) where explicit consent is relied upon.
Sharing and Processors
Data is shared only with approved processors needed to run the service: AWS (hosting, storage, and Bedrock LLM processing), Speechmatics (audio transcription), and Google (support-email delivery via Gmail).
Where the user connects the optional Crossuite integration, data is exchanged with the user's own Crossuite practice-management system on the user's instruction.
Optional export to Google Sheets: only when a therapist clicks Open in Google Sheets for a session, the filled Excel intake form is uploaded from the therapist's browser to the therapist's own Google Drive (access limited to files the app creates). Didenco's servers send no data to Google and do not receive or store the Google access token. That copy lives in the practice's Google account, outside the Service; Google is not a Didenco processor for this (unlike the support-email use of Gmail), and retention, access and deletion of the copy are the practice's responsibility.
The full processor list and DPAs are maintained in the Processor DPA Register below.
Sharing Within a Practice
Every user belongs to a practice. Patient records belong to the practice, not to an individual user.
All approved therapists of the same practice can view and edit every patient record of that practice, including sessions, notes, transcripts, documents, and files created by colleagues. This lets colleagues who treat the same patient work from one complete record.
Each session records which therapist treats it and who last edited its notes.
Patient records are never visible to users of another practice.
A therapist joins a practice with the practice code and has no access to any patient record until the practice admin approves the request. The admin can reject requests, remove members (access ends immediately; the records stay with the practice), and replace the practice code.
Data Location and Transfers
Primary processing and storage take place in the EEA (AWS eu-north-1 and eu-central-1).
Audio transcription (Speechmatics) and support email (Google/Gmail) may involve processing outside the EEA under Standard Contractual Clauses.
Copies exported to Google Sheets may be processed outside the EEA under Google's terms, as arranged by the practice.
Where third-country processing occurs, SCCs, a transfer risk assessment, and supplementary safeguards apply.
Retention
Medical records: typically 10 years (or as required by local law/contract).
Security logs: 90 days.
Support records: up to 1 year after closure.
Your Rights
Access, rectification, erasure, restriction, objection, portability, and complaint to a supervisory authority.
Contact jan@didenco.be to exercise rights.
Security
Encryption in transit and at rest, role-based access controls, audit logging, and incident response procedures.
2. Record of Processing Activities (RoPA)
Processing Register
Processing activity
Data subjects
Data types
Purpose
Legal basis (Art. 6 / 9)
Recipients/processors
Storage location
Retention
Security measures
Patient diagnosis/session records
Patients
Health data, identifiers, transcript, conversation summary, medical reports, example medical reports. Audio is transmitted to the transcription provider but not stored in the database.
Care support and session management
Art. 6(1)(b), Art. 9(2)(h) (or Art. 9(2)(a) with explicit consent)
Approved therapists of the controller's practice; AWS (hosting and Bedrock LLM processing); Speechmatics (audio transcription)
AWS EU (storage eu-north-1; Bedrock processing eu-central-1)
10 years (or local law)
Encryption at rest/in transit, RBAC, logs
User account management
Clinicians/staff
Name, email, role, auth metadata, practice membership and practice role
Authentication, access control, and practice membership
Appointment/agenda events, patient identifiers, and session notes pushed to Crossuite
Two-way sync with the user's own Crossuite practice-management system
Art. 6(1)(b), Art. 9(2)(a)/(h)
Crossuite (service.crossuite.app), at the user's instruction and using the user's own credentials
Crossuite; connection tokens encrypted at rest in the Didenco database
Per the user's Crossuite account; tokens until the user disconnects
Encrypted credential storage, TLS
System monitoring and audit logs
Users/admins
IP, device, event logs, access logs (in infrastructure logs, not in application database)
Security monitoring and incident response
Art. 6(1)(b)
Amazon Web Services (AWS)
AWS EU (eu-north-1)
90 days
Restricted, access-controlled logs
Support communications
Users
Contact details (email address) and message content
Customer support and issue resolution
Art. 6(1)(b)
Google (Gmail/SMTP email delivery)
Google Workspace / Gmail (subject to Google's terms; may involve non-EEA processing)
Retained in the email inbox until no longer needed
Access controls, TLS in transit
Note: Session audio recordings themselves are not stored in the database; patient names, transcripts, conversation summaries, medical reports, and example medical reports are stored. Audio is transmitted to the transcription provider (Speechmatics) for processing.
Note: The optional "Open in Google Sheets" action is not a Didenco processing activity towards Google. When a therapist clicks it for a session, their browser downloads the filled Excel intake form from Didenco (as for the normal download) and uploads it directly from the browser to the therapist's own Google Drive (Google Drive API, drive.file scope only), converted to a Google Sheet. The Google access token stays in browser memory and is never sent to or stored on Didenco's servers; Didenco's servers send no data to Google for this feature. The resulting copy lives in the controller's Google account, outside the Service; Google is a destination chosen by the controller, not a Didenco sub-processor.
International Transfers
Primary processing and storage take place in the EEA (AWS eu-north-1 and eu-central-1).
Audio transcription is performed by Speechmatics (Cantab Research Ltd, United Kingdom) under a signed Data Processing Agreement. The UK benefits from an EU adequacy decision; any onward transfer to Speechmatics sub-processors outside the EEA/UK is covered by the EU Standard Contractual Clauses together with the UK Addendum. Speechmatics retains audio for no longer than 7 days and does not use it for model training.
Support email is handled via Google (Gmail), which may process data outside the EEA; where this occurs, appropriate transfer safeguards such as Standard Contractual Clauses apply.
Where third-country processing occurs, SCCs, a transfer risk assessment, and supplementary safeguards apply.
Intake forms that a therapist exports with "Open in Google Sheets" may be processed outside the EEA under Google's terms. This export is directed by the controller, who is responsible for an appropriate agreement with Google (e.g. Google Workspace with Google's Cloud Data Processing Addendum) and for any transfer safeguards; it is separate from the support-email processing above.
3. Processor DPA Register
Maintain signed DPAs for all processors handling personal data.
United Kingdom (EU adequacy); sub-processors may be outside the EEA
EU SCCs + UK Addendum
Yes — signed DPA (July 2026)
Google (Google Workspace / Gmail)
Support-email delivery (SMTP)
Contact email, support message content
Google (may be non-EEA)
EU SCCs (via Google Workspace Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
Yes — Google Workspace Cloud DPA (incorporated)
Note: Google Drive / Google Sheets export ("Open in Google Sheets") is not listed as a sub-processor. The upload runs from the therapist's browser to the therapist's own Google account, on the controller's instruction; Didenco's servers send no data to Google and hold no Google access token. The controller is responsible for its own agreement with Google (e.g. Google Workspace with Google's Cloud Data Processing Addendum). This is separate from Didenco's use of Google for support email.
Minimum Vendor Requirements
Signed DPA before production use.
Documented technical and organizational security measures.
Breach notification commitment without undue delay.
Subprocessor transparency and contractual flow-down.
4. Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)
Processing Overview
Product: Administrative AI agentic platform to automate administrative workflows for physiotherapists.
High-risk processing: health data (special-category), potentially large-scale records.
Data subjects: patients, clinicians.
Storage scope: patient names, transcripts, conversation summaries, medical reports, and example medical reports are stored in the database; audio recordings are not stored.
Purpose and Necessity
Purpose: support clinical workflows and secure record handling.
Necessity: process only data needed for diagnosis/session workflow and legal obligations.
Data exposure through misconfiguration or compromised credentials.
Access to a practice's records by someone who obtained the practice code, or by a former colleague who kept access after leaving.
Transfer of personal or medical data to third-country sub-processors without adequate safeguards.
Exposure of exported intake forms (health data) placed in a Google account outside the Service, for example a personal/consumer Google account without an appropriate agreement, processing outside the EEA under Google's terms, or retention there beyond the justified period.
Excessive retention beyond justified period.
Incomplete rights-handling response.
Measures and Safeguards
Encryption at rest and in transit.
Strong authentication and least-privilege access.
Practice isolation: patient records are only accessible to approved therapists of the practice they belong to.
A practice code alone grants no access: every join request must be approved by the practice admin. Attempts to use a code are rate-limited, and the admin can replace a code that may have leaked.
The practice admin removes leavers; removal ends access immediately.
Segregation of environments and restricted admin access.
Audit logging and monitoring with incident escalation.
Backups, restore testing, and key management controls.
Architecture rationale for processing-time encryption options is documented in the Security Policy below (AWS Nitro Enclaves and end-to-end encryption of patient names assessed and rejected as not feasible for current workflow).
Google Sheets export: opt-in per session and only on the therapist's click; Google access limited to the drive.file scope (only files the app creates, no access to the rest of the Drive); the upload runs from the browser and the access token stays in browser memory, never sent to or stored on Didenco's servers; Didenco's servers send no data to Google. The controller is responsible for an appropriate agreement with Google (e.g. Google Workspace with Google's Cloud Data Processing Addendum), a legal basis, and the retention, access and deletion of the exported copy; the manual advises against personal Google accounts.
5. Data Retention Policy
Retention Schedule
Data category
Default retention
Justification
Deletion method
Medical records and session notes
10 years (or local legal requirement)
Clinical/legal obligations
Secure deletion from primary + backups per schedule
Account/profile data
Contract term + 1 year
Service administration and dispute handling
Hard delete/anonymization
Security and access logs
90 days
Security monitoring and incident response
Automated log lifecycle expiry
Support tickets/emails
1 year after closure
Support continuity and quality assurance
Periodic purge
Rules
Keep data no longer than necessary for stated purpose.
Apply legal hold when required (litigation/regulatory).
Review retention exceptions quarterly.
Record deletion/anonymization operations where feasible.
Copies a therapist exports with "Open in Google Sheets" live in the practice's own Google account, outside the Service. They are not covered by this schedule: Didenco cannot see, delete or manage them, and their retention and deletion are the controller's responsibility.
6. Security Policy (Personal and Medical Data)
Technical Controls
Encryption at rest for databases and storage (AWS KMS).
TLS for data in transit.
Role-based access control and least privilege.
Secrets managed outside source code.
Operational Controls
Access reviews at least quarterly.
Logging and monitoring of security-relevant events.
Patch and vulnerability management process.
Backup policy with restore testing.
Change management for production systems.
Governance
Security incidents handled under the Data Breach Procedure.
Annual policy review and update after material architecture change.
Encryption for Data in Processing: Options Considered
To strengthen protection of data while actively being processed, two additional approaches were formally evaluated.
Option A: AWS Nitro Enclaves
Assessment outcome: not feasible for current application workflow.
The application's processing depends on outbound calls to external services to generate outputs: AWS Bedrock for LLM generation and an external transcription provider (Speechmatics) reached over the internet.
AWS Nitro Enclaves are intentionally isolated and do not provide direct outbound network connectivity from inside the enclave.
Although enclave communication through a parent instance is possible, this architecture does not allow the enclave itself to directly perform the outbound service/API calls required by the processing step.
Moving those calls outside the enclave would remove the sensitive processing step from the enclave boundary and would not satisfy the intended security objective for this use case.
Conclusion: Nitro Enclaves were considered, but rejected for this architecture because the required real-time external service dependency conflicts with enclave network isolation constraints.
Option B: End-to-End Encryption of Patient Names
Assessment outcome: not feasible for current application workflow.
The LLM-driven processing flow requires patient names in readable form at inference time for context-aware generation and administrative output quality.
If patient names remained end-to-end encrypted throughout processing, the LLM request payload could not be interpreted correctly without prior decryption.
Decrypting immediately before LLM processing means the data is no longer end-to-end encrypted during the actual processing operation, which defeats the objective of true E2E protection for this field.
The current product behavior therefore requires controlled plaintext handling during the active processing window.
Conclusion: End-to-end encryption of patient names was considered, but rejected because required LLM processing depends on plaintext access and the application workflow prohibits strict E2E encryption for this field.
7. Data Breach Procedure
Privacy contact: jan@didenco.be
1) Detect and Triage
Intake from monitoring, logs, support, or staff reports.
Classify severity and scope (systems, data categories, impacted users).
2) Contain and Investigate
Isolate affected systems/accounts.
Preserve evidence and timeline.
Determine root cause and data exposure extent.
3) Notify
Notify supervisory authority within 72 hours when required by GDPR.
Notify affected individuals without undue delay when high risk exists.
Keep internal incident record for all breaches (including non-reportable).
4) Remediate and Learn
Apply fixes and verify containment.
Document corrective actions and policy/control updates.
Run post-incident review within 10 business days.
8. Access Control Policy
Principles
Least privilege: users receive minimum required access.
Need-to-know for patient data.
Segregation of duties for admin-sensitive actions.
Requirements
Unique user accounts; no shared credentials.
Role-based permissions documented and approved.
Joiner/mover/leaver process within defined SLA.
Quarterly access recertification.
Practice-Based Access to Patient Records
Access to patient records is granted per practice. Approved therapists (role admin or member) of a practice can view and edit all patient records of that practice; users of other practices cannot.
Joiners: a therapist signs up with the practice code and is pending until the practice admin approves. A pending user cannot view, open, or create any patient record.
Leavers: the practice admin removes the therapist from the practice; access ends immediately. The patient records and the sessions the therapist recorded remain with the practice as part of the medical record.
The practice admin keeps the practice code confidential and replaces it when it may have been shared beyond the practice; the previous code stops working at once.
The practice, as controller, decides who belongs to it and is responsible for granting access only to staff with a need to know.
Emergency Access
Break-glass access allowed only for urgent clinical/operational need.
Must be time-limited, logged, and reviewed.
9. Key Management Policy
Scope
Covers encryption keys used for databases, storage, backups, and secrets encryption.
Controls
Keys are generated and stored in managed KMS/HSM-capable services.
Production key access restricted to approved roles.
Backup/restore procedures include key dependency checks.
Changes to key policies are peer-reviewed and documented.
10. Vendor Risk Assessment
Use this checklist before onboarding vendors that process personal or medical data.
Note: Google Drive / Google Sheets, used by the optional "Open in Google Sheets" export, is not onboarded as a Didenco vendor: the upload runs from the therapist's browser to the controller's own Google account, and Didenco's servers send no data to Google. Assessing Google for that use (agreement, legal basis, data location) is the controller's responsibility.